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1. Introduction 
For several decades now we have been observing an 
acceleration1 of political, social, and societal inter-, 
trans-, and supranationalization2 that often is de-
                                                 
1 Hartmut Rosa, Beschleunigung und Entfremdung. Entwurf einer 
Kritischen Theorie spätmoderner Zeitlichkeit, Berlin 2013, in 
particular part 1, points out that acceleration represents an im-
portant feature of modernity and contemporary globalization. 
2 Inter-, trans-, and supranational relations are different types of 
relations that should not be confused. However, they all are types 
of cross-border relations. Since this paper focuses on boundaries, 
inter-, trans-, and supranational relations are relevant because of 
their shared transboundary and cross-border significance. Be-
cause of that, but in particular for the sake of readability, I will 
avoid using and repeating the phrase of inter-, trans-, and supra-
nationalization, but rather follow both general linguistic usage 
and common practice in political science and speak about inter-
nationalization, international relations, international politics, etc. 
in an encompassing manner, including the trans- and suprana-
tional dimension. Thus, ‘international’ will be used largely synon-
scribed in terms of fading boundaries3 or even 
“Boundarylessness”.4 These dissolutions of bounda-
ries, however, can be associated with new boundaries 
being established elsewhere, for a new purpose and 
with new functions. Such de- and reboundarizations 
reflect that boundaries are characterized by “the 
capability of being simultaneously dissolved and 
set”,5 and that any social or political distinction, 
                                                                        
ymous with ‘transboundary’ or ‘cross-border’. Whenever the 
differences between the inter-, trans-, and supranational level is 
relevant, this will be indicated. 
3 See for instance Chris Rumford, Cosmopolitan Spaces. Europe, 
Globalization, Theory, New York 2008; Michael Hardt/Antonio 
Negri, Empire, Cambridge–London 2001; Ulrich Beck, The 
Cosmopolitan Vision, Cambridge 2006. 
4 Beck, Cambridge (see note 3), 17. 
5 Ehrhardt Cremers, Grenze und Horizont. Protosoziologische 
Reflexionen zu einer Phänomenologie und Soziologie sozialer Gren-
zen, Hagen 1986, 86. All translations from German are my own. 
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definition, categorization, and selection6 will imply a 
decision on, at, and through boundaries. 
Although boundaries may be considered a uni-
versal medium7 of both order-building and under-
standing, in the social sciences as well as in the public 
discourse nevertheless an intuitive moral skepticism 
with respect to boundary settings of any kind pre-
vails.8 Boundaries are discussed in terms of their 
supposed twofold negative function: On the one 
hand, they are regarded as obstacles in a purely 
structural sense, as impeding, stopping, and hinder-
ing phenomena. On the other hand, they are regarded 
as negative in a normative sense in that they obstruct 
whatever is, broadly speaking, desirable. We can 
thus observe, firstly, a tendency to negative connota-
tions of boundaries in structural as well as normative 
terms. In this regard, the objective of overcoming 
boundaries appears as a principally sound ethical 
ideal.9 Secondly, in political science boundaries are 
prevalently connoted in a territorial and spatial 
sense. Taking this into account and at the same time 
considering that political internationalization as well 
as globalization, by definition, are characterized by 
an intensification of political activity across national 
borders, it is hardly surprising that political science 
has paid special attention to the increasing insignifi-
cance of boundaries on one side10 as well as to 
boundaries in a territorial sense on the other side. 
The role and function of boundaries in the context 
of intensified cross-border politics are discussed in 
                                                 
6 Cf. the focus on “selective boundaries” in Welttrends. Zeitschrift 
für internationale Politik, Themenschwerpunkt ‚Selektive Gren-
zen‘ 18: 71. 2010. 
7 Cremers, Hagen (see note 5), 163, aptly introduces the term 
“medium”. 
8 Cf. Margaret Moore, Conclusion and Overview, in: Allan Bu-
chanan/Margaret Moore (eds.), States, Nations, and Borders. The 
Ethics of Making Boundaries, Cambridge 2003, 317-337, see 335. 
9 Cf. on this Christel Baltes-Löhr, Grenzverschiebungen. Theorie-
konzepte zum Begriff ‚Grenze‘, in: Thomas Geisen/Allen Karcher 
(eds.), Grenze: Sozial – Politisch – Kulturell. Ambivalenzen in den 
Prozessen der Entstehung und Veränderung von Grenzen, Frank-
furt am Main–London 2003, 83-98, see 89f. In contrast, Mark 
Arenhövel, Abgrenzende Anerkennung. Für den produktiven 
Umgang mit Differenz in der Weltgesellschaft, in: Mark Arenhö-
vel/Maja Razbojnikova-Frateva/Hans-Gerd Winter (eds.), Kultur-
transfer und Kulturkonflikt, Dresden 2010, 55-69, see 67, points 
out that it is exactly the “separation principle” of the boundary 
“which ensures the coexistence of incommensurable life patterns”. 
10 Cf. Andreas Müller, Von Grenzfunktionen und Systemgrenzen, in: 
Welttrends. Zeitschrift für internationale Politik 71. 2010, 113-117. 
particular with regard to territoriality and mobility.11 
Globalization-focused studies often bring up the 
topic of boundaries by focusing on the suspension of 
boundaries in economic relations, on governance12 
as a response to ‘deboundaried’ policy fields and in 
terms of the end of the state and/or denationaliza-
tion of politics.13 As these rather macroscopic and 
often only implicit discussions of boundaries do not 
take a systematic perspective on boundaries and do 
not refer to their double meaning as both political 
and epistemic phenomena, they often tend to equate 
internationalization with the loss of significance of 
territorial borders and state boundaries.14 
In order to expand the perspective and to chal-
lenge the established identification of intensified 
cross-border relations in the era of globalization 
with a supposed loss of significance of boundaries, 
the following heuristic reflections will concentrate 
on a few select phenomena and changes of bounda-
ries under conditions of political internationaliza-
tion. The aim of this contribution15 is to look at 
rather particular boundary phenomena and changes. 
While indeed concentrating on boundaries that are 
constitutive with regard to state theory, I intend to 
zoom in on particular modes of appearance and on 
the micro-logics of these boundaries in transboundary 
                                                 
11 Cf. the enlightening article by Steffen Mau, Grenzen als Sor-
tiermaschinen, in: Welttrends. Zeitschrift für internationale 
Politik 71. 2010, 57-66, on how boundaries in globalization work 
as effective sorting machines enabling mobility for some groups 
and preventing mobility for other groups. 
12 For a comprehensive systematization of governance approach-
es, also pointing out the possibilities and limits of a governance 
focus, see Detlef Sack, Governance und Gouvernementalität – 
Komplementäres und Distinktes zweier Regierungslehren, in: 
Andreas Vasilache (ed.), Gouvernementalität, Staat und Weltge-
sellschaft, Wiesbaden 2014, 101-135. 
13 Cf. e.g. Marianne Beisheim/Sabine Dreher/Gregor Wal-
ter/Bernhard Zangl/Michael Zürn, Im Zeitalter der Globalisie-
rung. Thesen und Daten zur gesellschaftlichen und politischen 
Denationalisierung, Baden-Baden 1999; Allen Buchan-
an/Margaret Moore (eds.), States, Nations, and Borders. The 
Ethics of Making Boundaries, Cambridge 2003; Gerhard Prey-
er/Mathias Bös (eds.), Borderlines in a Globalized World. New 
Perspectives in a Sociology of the World-System, Dordrecht 2002; 
Rumford, New York (see note 3). 
14 Cf. again Rumford, New York (see note 3); Hardt/Negri, Cam-
bridge–London (see note 3); Beck, Cambridge (see note 3); 
Beisheim et al., Baden-Baden (see note 13); David Held, Global 
Covenant. The Social Democratic Alternative to the Washington 
Consensus, Cambridge 2004. 
15 I elaborated the following reflections in more detail in different 
previous (mostly German) publications. 
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politics. I expect that a micro-analytical perspective 
on boundaries and their particular realization modes 
can contribute to a better macroscopic assessment of 
boundaries in both IR and international politics. In 
so doing, boundaries are understood as political 
phenomena, while at the same time taking their 
epistemic significance into account. This double 
meaning as both political as well as epistemic princi-
ple of differentiation and distinction is a characteris-
tic trait of boundaries. In fact, boundaries can be con-
sidered as a particular type of distinction. While not 
every distinction has a political, social or normative 
implication, boundaries separate both different po-
litical areas and different epistemic scopes of (legal, 
legitimatory, regulatory, etc.) validity.16 
The following observations will focus on the 
boundary between domestic and foreign policy as 
well as the boundary between the public and the 
private sphere. But why focus on particularly these 
two boundaries? This choice is justified, firstly, as 
these two boundaries, with their significance in state 
theory, adopt a few remarkable modes of implemen-
tation under conditions of internationalization. 
Secondly, the boundaries between domestic and 
foreign policy and between the public and the pri-
vate sphere are both politically highly significant and 
constitute separated categorical and epistemic areas 
of validity. Thirdly, these boundaries refer to other 
major political and epistemic boundaries of the 
modern state, namely to “the institutional limits”17 
between legislative and executive sovereignty and to 
the categorial limits of sovereign power (domestic-
foreign boundary: limits of legal legitimacy as well as 
of the state’s ordering scope and power; public-
private boundary: limits of legitimate state interven-
                                                 
16 On this political as well as epistemic double meaning as a 
constitutive feature of boundaries cf. Markus Bauer/Rahn Thom-
as, Vorwort, in: Markus Bauer/Thomas Rahn (eds.), Die Grenze. 
Begriff und Inszenierung, Berlin 1997, 7-9, see 9; Allen Buchanan, 
The Making and Unmaking of Boundaries: What Liberalism Has 
to Say, in: Allen Buchanan/Margaret Moore (eds.), States, Na-
tions, and Borders. The Ethics of Making Boundaries, Cambridge 
2003, 231-261, see 236; Niklas Luhmann, Soziale Systeme. Grund-
riß einer allgemeinen Theorie, Frankfurt am Main 1987, 266; 
Walter Pohl, Soziale Grenzen und Spielräume der Macht, in: 
Walter Pohl/Helmut Reimitz (eds.), Grenze und Differenz im 
frühen Mittelalter, Wien 2000, 11-18, see 16; Andreas Vasilache, 
Der Staat und seine Grenzen. Zur Logik politischer Ordnung, 
Frankfurt am Main–New York 2007, chapter 1. 
17 Günter Frankenberg, Staatstechnik. Perspektiven auf Rechts-
staat und Ausnahmezustand, Berlin 2010, 16. 
tion). Fourthly, both the boundary between domes-
tic and foreign policy and the boundary between the 
public and the private sphere belong to those 
boundaries that are suspected of losing their signifi-
cance in the process of globalization and increasing 
international relations. It will, however, remain to 
discuss to which extent this is the case. 
The presented reflections basically aim at consid-
ering if we are really dealing with the disappearance 
of traditional boundaries in the course of interna-
tionalization and globalization – or rather with in-
creasingly flexible boundary lines, i.e. with the vola-
tility of boundaries, which does not necessarily mod-
ify or weaken the political and epistemic quality and 
function of boundaries or their political relevance. 
 
2. Domestic affairs and foreign policy 
2.1 Internationalization and the persistence  
of foreign policy 
If we consider globalization and the unprecedented 
rise of international relations as “increased and in-
tensified interdependencies of traffic, communica-
tion, and exchange across national borders”,18 we 
will notice that this increase and intensification of 
international politics is carried out, first and fore-
most, by a multiplication and intensification of na-
tional foreign policy. Certainly, this increase in qual-
ity and quantity of foreign policy activities cannot be 
understood in terms of Westphalian bilateralism. 
National governments are in fact interacting with 
various new actors (NGOs, transnational organiza-
tions in the broadest sense, international institu-
tions, a transnational civil society19) and within an 
emerging – or maybe even already existing – world 
society20 with multiple new forums and institutions. 
                                                 
18 Jürgen Habermas, Die postnationale Konstellation. Politische 
Essays, Frankfurt am Main 1998, 101. 
19 Cf. Jens Steffek, Die Legitimation internationalen Regierens: Vom 
Staatenkonsens zum Bürgerkonsens, in: Nicole Deitelhoff/Jens 
Steffek (eds.), Was bleibt vom Staat? Demokratie, Recht und Verfas-
sung im globalen Zeitalter, Frankfurt am Main–New York 2009, 
161-186. The expanded public awareness of international challenges 
and the intensified public discourse on international affairs can be 
seen as an important contribution to the democratization of foreign 
policy in democratic states. However, the possibilities for public 
deliberation outlined by Steffek can take place only within consoli-
dated democratic systems and between societies enjoying freedom 
of speech, of press, and of assembly. 
20 Cf. Mathias Albert, Zur Politik der Weltgesellschaft. Identität 
und Recht im Kontext internationaler Vergesellschaftung, Vel-
brück 2002. 
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Together, they deal with issues that nowadays can 
only be solved in regional or global cooperation, and 
non-governmental actors have become serious dia-
log partners in international affairs.21 
And yet, non-governmental actors can, in the 
end, realize their goals only by convincing or influ-
encing states and – more concrete – governments. 
With regard to the implementation and enforcement 
of international agreements or transnational regula-
tions, national governments remain relevant as pre-
rogative actors in a threefold sense: Firstly, they are 
the only ones authorized to agree on binding regula-
tions under international law. 
Secondly, as Müller points out, all private actors 
in international governance must legally constitute 
themselves in a state – and, thus, need the states to 
formally acknowledge or at least tolerate their politi-
cal (be it regulative, consultative, monitoring, etc.) 
functions and competencies in cross-border rela-
tions. Thus, even in international governance pro-
cesses and dynamics, in which states are not directly 
involved or not the main actors (for instance when 
common technical standards are negotiated and 
agreed between representatives of a particular indus-
trial sector), still “the state remains a virtual partici-
pant, i.e. in the background”.22 
And thirdly, states continue to monopolize the 
possibility of implementing and enforcing (or pre-
venting) such regulations by transposing (or not 
transposing) them within the national legal frame-
work. Actually, this is not only a state-, but rather a 
government-precedence – even though, in demo-
cratic states, the transposition into national law is 
                                                 
21 Cf. e.g. Bas Arts/Math Noortmann/Bob Reinalda (eds.), Non-
State Actors in International Relations, Aldershot 2001; Rodney B. 
Hall/Thomas J. Biersteker (eds.), The Emergence of Private Au-
thority in Global Governance, Cambridge 2002; Louis W. Pau-
ly/Edgar Grande, Reconstituting Political Authority: Sovereignty, 
Effectiveness, and Legitimacy in a Transnational Order, in: Edgar 
Grande/Louis W. Pauly (eds.), Complex Sovereignty. Recon-
structing Political Authority in the Twenty-First Century, Toron-
to 2005, 3-21, see 17; Tony Porter, The Private Production of 
Public Goods: Private and Public Norms in Global Governance, 
in: Edgar Grande/Louis W. Pauly (eds.), Complex Sovereignty. 
Reconstructing Political Authority in the Twenty-first Century, 
Toronto 2005, 217-237, see 217. 
22 Harald Müller, Staatlichkeit ohne Staat – ein Irrtum aus der 
europäischen Provinz? Limitierende Bedingungen von Global 
Governance in einer fragmentierten Welt, in: Nicole Deitel-
hoff/Jens Steffek (eds.): Was bleibt vom Staat? Demokratie, Recht 
und Verfassung im globalen Zeitalter, Frankfurt am Main–
NewYork 2009, 221-258, see 236. 
not a governmental, but a legislative competence. 
However, the legislative independence in transpos-
ing international law is limited to that effect that 
relevant legislation is not autonomous in terms of 
content, but rather required to insert existing inter-
national negotiation results into national law, to 
adapt them and to retrospectively reproduce the 
already given decision.23 Such structures and pro-
cesses can ultimately lead to the situation “that the 
agents de facto rule the political principals, whose 
agents they are”.24 This is intensified by the prece-
dence in information and technocratic competence 
that the foreign policy apparatus usually takes over 
national legislative institutions,25 so that the latter in 
general deal with international affairs only indirect-
ly, through the government. Taking a look at the 
separation of powers, we see that the structures and 
goals of international governance forums tend to 
favour governments over national legislative institu-
tions. Because of the very specialized thematic focus 
of transboundary governance settings and their aim 
on the effective enabling and concrete implementa-
tion of cross-border regulations, again, governments 
in fact take precedence over their parliaments. With 
their clearly specialized thematic task area, practical 
orientation, their focus on very concrete issues and 
questions, and their decided bias on problem-
solving, most forums and processes of international 
governance – even those that are allegedly ‘stateless’ 
– are located in the epistemic and political realm of 
the particular, the factual and the concrete. In the 
state’s institutional logics, this realm of the particu-
lar, the factual and the concrete is reserved for the 
executive power of the administration.26 
                                                 
23 Cf. also Gertrude Lübbe-Wolff, Die Internationalisierung der 
Politik und der Machtverlust der Parlamente, in: Hauke Brunk-
horst (ed.), Demokratie in der Weltgesellschaft, Sonderband 
Soziale Welt 18. 2009, 127-142, see 132. 
24 Rainer Schmalz-Bruns, An den Grenzen der Entstaatlichung. 
Bemerkungen zu Jürgen Habermas’ Modell einer ‚Weltinnenpoli-
tik ohne Weltregierung‘, in: Peter Niesen/Benjamin Herborth 
(eds.), Anarchie der kommunikativen Freiheit. Jürgen Habermas 
und die Theorie der internationalen Politik, Frankfurt am Main 
2007, 269-293, see 290. 
25 As Lübbe-Wolff, 2009 (see note 23), 134f, judge of the German 
Constitutional Court, points out, the German Constitutional 
Court has underlined this executive precedence in transboundary 
politics in a normative sense, too. 
26 See Vasilache, Frankfurt a.M.–New York (see note 16), chapter 
3.3, Andreas Vasilache, The Rise of Executive Sovereignty in the 
Era of Globalization, in: Mario Telò (ed.), State, Globalization and 
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These observations on the role of the state and na-
tional governments in international governance (no 
matter, whether supposedly ‘stateless’ or not) of 
course take into account that the modes of trans-
boundary policy-making have substantially changed. 
Thus, the outlined reflections should not be mistak-
en as asserting an unchanged continuity of the 
Westphalian order and its state- and government-
centric logics and structures of international politics. 
Quite the contrary, foreign policy ever increasingly 
takes place in and (re-)produces cross-border multi-
level structures with a plurality not only of different 
actors, but of different types of actors. As Held right-
ly stresses globalization is “associated with the ex-
pansion of the terms of political activity.”27 At the 
same time, it has to be pointed out that the changing 
phenomenon in question continues to be foreign 
policy in that the traditional boundary between 
domestic and foreign affairs still persists. The struc-
tures, dynamics, and processes of foreign policy have 
indeed changed, but this has by no means led to the 
weakening of the systematic distinction between 
domestic policy and foreign policy. The latter con-
tinues to be constituted as a special policy field, cate-
gorically separated from domestic affairs and subject 
to governmental pre-eminence. Still, international 
politics is both dealt with and discursively represen-
ted as a political sphere somehow apart from ‘nor-
mal’ politics (with its reliable legal system, formal-
ized procedures, party disputes, overt pluralism of 
social interests, checks and balances of states powers, 
etc.). Even under conditions of substantially in-
creased internationalization and “Multicentric Gov-
ernance”,28 cross-border politics are characterized by 
a “rise of government networks”29 and, thus, seem to 
remain a sphere of activity mainly for – referring to 
                                                                        
Multilateralism. The Challenges of Institutionalizing Regionalism, 
Dordrecht–New York 2012, 137-157, see 138-140; Lübbe-Wolff 
2009 (see note 23), 134f; see for the systematic foundation of the 
separation of powers in social contract theory Jean-Jacques Rous-
seau, Œuvres complètes, ed. by Bernard Gagnebin and Marcel 
Raymond. (Bibliothèque de la Pléiade.) Vol. III. Du contrat social. 
Écrits politiques, Paris 1964, 369-371, 378-384, 395-400; cf. on the 
relation between law, executive ordinances, and the governmental 
role of the police Michel Foucault, Geschichte der Gouvernemen-
talität I. Sicherheit, Territorium, Bevölkerung. Vorlesung am 
Collège de France 1977-1978, Frankfurt am Main 2004, 488f. 
27 Held, Cambridge (see note 14), 88. 
28 Held, Cambridge (see note 14), 75. 
29 Held, Cambridge (see note 14), 75. 
Slaughter – “national government officials”.30 Thus, 
the work with and within new international structures 
and processes can well be considered to be the spe-
cific form that foreign policy nowadays increasingly 
takes. This form is, on the one hand, replacing the 
traditional, quasi Westphalian shape of international 
relations – while, on the other hand, the systematic 
demarcation between domestic policy and foreign 
affairs based on the distinction between internal and 
external sovereignty is thereby conceptually left 
untouched.31 This does not only indicate that territo-
rial state borders keep their political and policy-
relevance even under conditions of internationaliza-
tion.32 It moreover shows that the constitutive 
boundary of the modern, i.e. contractarian state 
between domestic and foreign policy spaces continues 
to persist and takes effect in its fundamental func-
tional logic as a boundary between two categorially 
distinct political and epistemic areas of validity. This 
seems to be the case for international, transnational, 
and – as indicated by the (still) strongly intergovern-
mental structures of politics within the EU33 – for 
supranational contexts as well.34 
 
2.2 The volatility of foreign policy 
The persistence of the systematic boundary dividing 
domestic and foreign policy is even reflected in the 
increasing discursive internationalization of many 
policy issues or entire policy fields. The fact that “not 
one relevant issue of economy, politics, and culture 
[…] nowadays seems discussable without its global 
references”,35 by no means necessarily leads to a 
weakening of the systematic boundary between do-
mestic and foreign policy, but rather and frequently 
                                                 
30 Held, Cambridge (see note 14), 75; see also Robert O. Keohane, 
The Contingent Legitimacy of Multilateralism, in: GARNET 
Working Paper 09/06. 2006, 3, 10. 
31 On the continued executive priority in transboundary politics 
and the resulting legitimacy problems in democratic states cf. e.g. 
Klaus-Dieter Wolf, The New Raison d’État as a Problem for 
Democracy in World Society, in: European Journal of Interna-
tional Relations 5: 3. 1999, 333-363. 
32 See Müller, Frankfurt a.M.–New York (see note 22), 228. 
33 See Andrew Moravcsik, The Myth of Europe's ‘Democratic 
Deficit’, in: Intereconomics. Journal of European Economic 
Policy, November/December 2008, 331-340. 
34 On the notion of supranationalism see Andreas Vasilache, 
Supranational Power – Approaching a Theoretical Dilemma, in: 
Dai Bingran/Jian Junbo (eds.), The Enlarged European Union. 
Prospects and Implications, Baden-Baden 2008, 41-56. 
35 Klaus Müller, Globalisierung, Frankfurt a.M.–New York 2002, 7. 
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to what one could call a foreign-politicization of 
domestic policy – i.e. to an import of government-
biased foreign policy issues and logics into domestic 
policies. This holds true especially in the field of 
security policy. We are witnessing an expansion of 
security policy logics and the integration of security 
imperatives in various policy fields, justified with 
transboundary challenges. For purely illustrative 
purposes it should be pointed out that discourses on 
educational as well as on criminal policy in Europe 
are meanwhile often held as debates about migra-
tion, integration, and Muslim fundamentalism, 
whereas discourses on pluralism and immigration 
are threatened of “being dealt with merely in catego-
ries of internal security”.36 The expanding sugges-
tions, demands, and regulations in the field of do-
mestic security are more and more frequently justi-
fied with cross-border problems, threats, and, more 
and more often, risks.37 This indicates that interna-
tionalization can well be performed by integrating 
issues, categories, and logics of executive-dominated 
foreign policy into the realm of domestic affairs. The 
external threat or risk remains being discussed and 
understood as an international, foreign challenge – 
save for its occurrence within the state, thus chal-
lenging foreign policy as well as external security 
organs38 within the state’s domestic area itself.39 
From a systematic perspective focused on 
boundaries, the discursive internationalization of 
particular political issues or entire policy fields can 
be understood as a process of a permanent and sim-
                                                 
36 Jürgen Habermas, Ach, Europa. Kleine politische Schriften XI, 
Frankfurt am Main 2008, 92. 
37 On risk-focused security rationalities see Oliver Kessler, Risk, 
in: J. Peter Burgess (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of New Secu-
rity Studies, Abingdon 2010, 17-26; Robert Castel, From Danger-
ousness to Risk, in: Graham Burchell/Colin Gordon/Peter Miller 
(eds.), The Foucault Effect. Studies in Governmentality. With two 
lectures by and an interview with Michel Foucault, London 1991, 
281-298; Mitchell Dean, Governmentality. Power and Rule in 
Modern Society, London 1999, 177; Claudia Aradau/Rens van 
Munster, Governing Terrorism Through Risk: Taking Precau-
tions, (Un)Knowing the Future, in: European Journal of Interna-
tional Relations 13: 1. 2007, 89-115. 
38 Cf. the recurring demand of (usually conservative) politicians 
for the deployment of the German Federal Armed Forces within 
the German borders. 
39 Frankenberg, Berlin (see note 17), 39, speaks about the fight 
against internal enemies, while my focus is on the particularity 
that these enemies, threats, and risks in governmental discourses 
rather are (re-)presented and constituted as, so to speak, incorpo-
rated external or embedded external ones. 
ultaneous removal and setting of boundaries. In this 
process, governments on the one hand point out the 
transboundary context and relevance of the respec-
tive phenomenon, while on the other hand and at 
the same time the government retains its prerogative 
power in cross-border affairs, and foreign policy 
remains bound to its systematic executive focus on 
particular and factual measures. Neither the exist-
ence of boundaries nor their categorical function of 
separating the domestic area of the state from its 
external environment and domestic from foreign 
policy respectively is thereby systematically or con-
ceptually called into question. Thus, it might be 
insufficient to outline that nowadays, “the anyway 
porous state boundaries seem to be particularly open 
and precarious”.40 Rather, the discursive internation-
alization of various issues, problems or entire subject 
areas still seems to be based on the logic of a strict 
political and epistemic demarcation between the 
inside and the outside, between domestic and for-
eign policy – this boundary now, however, being 
flexible and volatile and no longer necessarily in line 
with the state’s territorial borders. 
This can also be observed when governments 
turn to other states with specific requests or de-
mands for regulating matters that are under the 
addressed state’s domestic policy. Especially in eco-
nomic and ecological issues, attempts at directly 
influencing other states are markedly more accepted 
today than some decades ago. For instance, in the 
course of current industrialization processes, ecolog-
ical ignorance can no longer be considered a merely 
domestic affair. States that do not concern them-
selves adequately with ecological sustainability be-
come likely to incur international pressure, with 
other governments openly asserting their claim to 
influencing the relevant policy of the respective state. 
The issue being dealt with thereby undergoes, on the 
one hand, internationalization in that the issue in 
question is not accepted to be a purely domestic 
issue any more. With regard to the negotiating ac-
tors and the international dynamics, such processes, 
on the other hand, from the perspective of the ad-
dressed state structurally represent a foreign-
politicization. The issue discussed is discursively 
transferred from the realm of the domestic legislative 
                                                 
40 Frankenberg, Berlin (see note 17), 19. 
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negotiation process to the field of foreign policy and 
its executive and intergovernmental bias. 
It may well be considered a particular achieve-
ment of European integration to have limited the 
traditional Westphalian principle of non-
interference with domestic politics of other states. 
However, although the non-interference principle 
experiences a by far weaker position and less politi-
cal acknowledgement in the EU than in non-
European international politics, the phenomenon at 
hand in its structure and systematic logic still re-
mains an interference with domestic affairs. It is 
performed and negotiated between governments and 
their executive, diplomatic apparatus (either directly 
on a bilateral level, between the respective national 
and the European executive or in the Council of 
Ministers) and takes place in international forums 
and institutions. The structure of deciding and nego-
tiating claims of EU members toward each other is 
still basically intergovernmental and based on a clear 
demarcation between domestic affairs and foreign 
policy. The persistence of the domestic-foreign 
boundary as well as the following executive bias is 
obvious in the relation between the EU member 
states, but is salient also in genuinely supranational 
structures and procedures of the EU, and even in 
cases, in which the European Parliament has co-
decision authority. The particular ‘foreign policy’ 
status of EU policy is, by the way, also reflected in 
the fact that in most EU member states EU policy is 
assigned to foreign ministries or special ministries 
for European affairs. 
The persistence of the categorial boundary be-
tween domestic and foreign policy also becomes 
obvious when states deliberately constitute special 
exterritorial spaces (or plan to do so) and thereby 
pay meticulous attention to institutionalizing these 
areas either as external domestic areas or as domestic 
external areas. These areas are, on the one hand, 
outside the state’s domestic sphere of legal and epis-
temic validity, but they are still exclusively subject to 
the respective government and its executive foreign 
affair logics. Examples for this are reception or 
prison camps (like the migrant reception camps in 
Australia or the Guantánamo detention camp), 
states of emergency, and also territory-related civil 
wars accompanied by a legal separation of the em-
battled area from the rest of the national territory, 
while at the same time the conflict area is still 
claimed – in particular towards the international 
community – as being part of the domestic territory 
(for example Chechnya or Aceh). On the one hand, 
such phenomena are characterized by leaving the 
boundary between the interior and the exterior un-
decided.41 On the other hand and at the same time, 
the establishing of such areas is necessarily based on 
a strict and categorial demarcation between internal 
and external affairs. All spaces not clearly assigned to 
the domestic area of legal validity are thus handed 
over to the sphere of executive-dominated foreign 
policy, even if the boundary of foreign policy no 
longer corresponds to the national territorial borders. 
In summary we can state that the boundary be-
tween domestic and foreign policy is becoming in-
creasingly flexible and detached from national terri-
torial borders. We must consider this as an essential 
development, both from a political as well as a sys-
tematic theoretical viewpoint. This is of considerable 
significance for state theory as well as for practical 
politics – not least in normative terms – because the 
boundary of domestic legal validity is becoming 
uncertain and this uncertainty is shifting the relation 
of powers toward the executive. However, the vola-
tility of the boundary between domestic and foreign 
policy does not amount to its disappearance, but is 
based precisely on its persistence and its political and 
epistemic rigidity and rigour. Thus, Held’s statement 
that the “idea of global politics calls into question the 
traditional demarcations between the domestic and 
the foreign, and between the territorial and the non-
territorial”,42 cannot, at least not generally, be con-
firmed from the perspective of a systematic bounda-
ry analysis. Under the current conditions of intensi-
fied political internationalization it is rather possible 
for these two boundaries – which Held equates and 
state theory views as congruent – to separate and to 
move apart from one another. 
 
2.3 Political consequences 
Having said this, not only in the context of bounda-
ry-focused analyses, but also in normative terms it 
seems advisable to take a close look at the boundary 
between internal and external affairs – rather than 
prematurely presupposing that this boundary has 
                                                 
41 Cf. Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer. Sovereign Power and Bare 
Life, Stanford 1998. 
42 Held, Cambridge (see note 14), 74. 
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already become irrelevant. Considering the expan-
sion and intensification of transboundary politics, 
we can follow Deitelhoff and Steffek in that “the 
question of the possibility of hierarchical self-
intervention”43 and its “links to processes of self-
legislation and the rule of law”44 is still awaiting an 
answer. In terms of legitimacy this cannot be ig-
nored as the process of foreign-politicization implies 
a subtle de-democratization of democratic constitu-
tional systems. This problem is not new: The 
strengthening of the executive power within the 
political system favors exactly that institution of the 
modern state, which has always, theoretically and 
empirically, posed the greatest inherent challenge to a 
liberal democratic order, making it a priority for de-
mocratic theory and practice to control and tame it.45 
To prematurely dismiss the boundary between 
domestic and foreign policy would thus not only be 
a factual error, but it also tends to be questionable 
from a normative point of view. It would mean to 
forgo the possibility to discuss both the desired and 
undesired implications of this distinction, as well as 
the possibility to renegotiate or modify it. Analyti-
cally neglecting this political as well as epistemic 
boundary would intensify the problem in question, 
as it would either result in scholarly apologetics of 
questionable foreign-politicizations of political is-
sues and structures, or at least would weaken the 
analytical means to address and counteract such 
tendencies. The statement that “the possibility of 
nation-state self-legislation in a globalized, highly 
interdependent world de facto no longer exists”46 is 
an altogether too broad generalization in that it 
underestimates the necessity for differentiating be-
tween challenges that can no longer be regulated in a 
national context, on the one hand, and such issues, 
on the other hand, that can still be successfully and 
legitimately regulated on a national scale – or even 
below that. 
                                                 
43 Nicole Deitelhoff/Jens Steffek, Einleitung: Staatlichkeit ohne 
Staat?, in: Nicole Deitelhoff/Jens Steffek (eds.), Was bleibt vom 
Staat? Demokratie, Recht und Verfassung im globalen Zeitalter, 
Frankfurt am Main–New York 2009, 7-34, see 31. 
44 Deitelhoff/Steffek, Frankfurt a.M.–New York (see note 43), 31. 
45 See already Rousseau, Paris (see note 26), 421ff, 434ff and John 
Locke, Two Treatises of Government. A critical ed. with an in-
trod. and apparatus criticus by Peter Laslett, Cambridge 1966, §§ 
143-158. 
46 Deitelhoff/Steffek, Frankfurt a.M.–New York (see note 43), 31. 
That we are not talking merely about an abstract 
issue, but about a current political phenomenon can 
be demonstrated by the trend of securitization, 
which jeopardizes the “hard-won desecuritizing 
achievements of liberalism […] over the past three 
centuries”.47 A particular example is the concept of 
human security, in which the consumption of “nar-
cotic drugs and a growing sense of individual isola-
tion”48 and even traffic accidents and individual 
crime are defined as objects of cross-border security 
policy49 under the vague and broad slogan of “hu-
man distress”.50 Ironically, the alleged boundlessness 
of all policy fields as well as the dismissal of the idea 
of nationally confined, domestic policy-making and 
legislation in times of globalization are positions that 
are regularly put forward in rather liberal approach-
es in IR, but in fact revive the realist idea of the 
black-box model: A differentiated view distinguish-
ing precisely between issues that can only be regulat-
ed on the international scale, and those that can still 
be regulated on a national level is replaced by the 
hypothesis of a general dissolution and fading of 
territorial and systematic boundaries, construing the 
modern state as being systematically overcharged 
and therefore unable to cope with current problems 
and challenges – irrespective of the state or the 
policy field concerned. 
To be clear: Pointing out the shortcomings of 
overhasty assertions of a world without borders is 
not to be confused with indiscriminately demanding 
recourse to a policy of national self-referentiality or 
self-sufficiency. I am, in contrast, arguing the case 
for a precise assessment of the boundary between 
domestic and foreign policies. Differentiated analyti-
cal consideration is necessary in order to not hastily 
hand issues, which it makes sense to deal with on a 
national scale, over to an international sphere that is 
characterized by a “stretched chain of legitimacy in 
connection with the problem of executive bias”.51 
                                                 
47 Barry Buzan/Ole Wæver/Jaap de Wilde, Security. A New 
Framework for Analysis, Boulder–London 1998, 210. 
48 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Human 
Development Report 1994, New York–London 1994, 2. 
49 Cf. UNDP, New York–London (see note 48), 30. 
50 UNDP, New York–London (see note 48), 30. On the Human 
Security approach see Christoph Schuck (ed.), Security in a 
Changing Global Environment. Challenging the Human Security 
Approach, Baden-Baden 2011. 
51 Rainer Schmalz-Bruns, Moralisch-reflexive Staatlichkeit? Zum 
normativen Profil der jüngeren Debatte über ‚Staatlichkeit ohne 
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Therefore, discussing the factual persistence of the 
systematic boundary between domestic and foreign 
policy with its dangers and normative potentials 
does not refer to a traditional Westphalian ideal, but 
addresses the domestic-foreign-boundary under 
conditions of political internationalization. Ac-
knowledging the persistence of this boundary also 
implies perceiving and acknowledging the substan-
tial and qualitative changes of the structure, the 
actors, and the dynamics of contemporary interna-
tional politics. At the same time this view makes it 
possible to call to mind the necessity for “democratic 
limits of the denationalization of world domestic 
politics [Weltinnenpolitik]”.52 
 
3. The public and the private 
The boundary between the public and the private 
sphere is constitutive in terms of state and democrat-
ic as well as legal theory. Ideal-typically, public inter-
ests, norms, and claims to validity always relate and 
apply to all possible addressees within the state. The 
private sphere, meanwhile, represents those spaces 
where rules, interests, and preferences take effect 
(within the limits of legality) that pertain only to a 
certain group of people within the entire collective 
or to single individuals. This sphere is largely free 
from state intervention in the sense of Isaiah Berlin’s 
concept of negative freedom.53 The categorial 
boundary between the public and the private sphere 
results from the contractual logic of modern 
stateness and the idea of the rule of law.54 However, 
while the political as well as epistemic boundary 
between the public and the private sphere of validity 
and regulation is a sine qua non of the modern state 
as well as of the idea of law, the concrete decision as 
to which issues fall within the scope of public validi-
ty and regulation (addressing everyone in the name 
of all) and which are subject to private regulation 
and/or preferences, i.e. the exact boundary line be-
tween the public and the private sphere, is indeed 
variable and has been made differently at different 
times and places. 
                                                                        
Staat’, in: Nicole Deitelhoff/Jens Steffek (eds.), Was bleibt vom 
Staat? Demokratie, Recht und Verfassung im globalen Zeitalter, 
Frankfurt am Main–New York 2009, 75-105, see 90. 
52 Schmalz-Bruns, Frankfurt a.M.–New York (see note 51), 102. 
53 Cf. Isaiah Berlin, Liberty, Oxford 2002, 166-217. 
54 Cf. Vasilache, Frankfurt a.M.–New York (see note 16), chapters 
3.3, 3.4. 
Now, the process of internationalization as well as 
globalization is characterized by increasingly intensi-
fied cross-border relations between private actors. In 
the first instance, this phenomenon may be consid-
ered as pertaining solely to the private sphere and 
therefore not per se affecting the boundary between 
the private and the public sphere. The need for regu-
lation, however, resulting from the increase of pri-
vate transboundary activities and the acknowledge-
ment that private actors may be both the cause of 
and the remedy for challenging problems (ecological 
ones, for instance), have led to private organizations 
gaining political significance in international gov-
ernance. This in turn causes fluxions to the bounda-
ry between the public and private sphere itself. 
Therefore, I will now pay attention to two particular 
modes of implementation of the boundary between 
the public and the private sphere, the first of which 
points at a categorical and epistemic reconstitution 
of this boundary and the second at its volatility. 
 
3.1 Privatized public 
If we consider the privatization of sovereign, espe-
cially security-relevant state responsibilities and 
functions, we will find it to have a twofold sense, 
with the second level being particularly relevant 
from a boundary-analytical perspective. When pri-
vate actors get involved in ensuring sovereign func-
tions, on the one hand, this simply is a privatization 
in the (literal) sense of public functions becoming 
private ones – i.e. of the private sphere expanding to 
the disadvantage of the public sphere. 
On the other hand, however, the state can never 
completely withdraw from those fields of action that 
belong to the sovereign subject area of security. This 
is why the privatization of security-relevant func-
tions and responsibilities can also be understood as a 
privatization of the state’s actor status and its very 
actor quality. The provision of security and the en-
forceable assertion of legitimate and the rejection of 
illegitimate claims based on its legal system are core 
– and even constitutive – duties of the modern state 
and part of its raison d’être. Therefore the state can-
not completely shed its security-relevant responsibili-
ties and functions, even if they are transferred to 
private actors.55 As long as a state exists, it must 
                                                 
55 Cf. on this topic Volker Heins/Jens Warburg, Kampf der Zivilis-
ten. Militär und Gesellschaft im Wandel, Bielefeld 2004; Ken 
Silverstein, Private Warriors, London 2000; Thomas Jäger/ 
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rather reserve the role of controlling the private 
security actors as well as the possibility to reseize the 
previously privatized, security-relevant duties and 
functions at all times.56 Thus, whenever private or-
ganizations are entrusted with fulfilling functions 
that belong to the core of state sovereignty, they are 
in fact always acting on behalf of or in the name of 
the state. When it comes to privatizing security-
relevant functions, the state to some extent always 
remains involved. The respective private companies 
do not – and conceptually cannot – act completely 
on their own behalf, but always directly or indirectly 
on behalf of the state. They act on direct behalf when 
fulfilling requirements or concrete assignments by 
the state.57 They act on indirect behalf when the state 
simply withdraws from ensuring particular security 
services and private organizations step up to fill the 
gap – which the state is however always authorized 
to fill on its own again.58 In sovereign policy fields, 
i.e. in fields, in which the state has a prerogative 
regulatory power, private actors therefore principally 
work until recalled and they, at least potentially, 
have to answer directly to the state for each of their 
actions. Hereby, the state gains a second – executive 
– pillar that is constituted and operates through 
private actors, and yet remains under state control. 
                                                                        
Gerhard Kümmel (eds.), Private Military and Security Compa-
nies. Chances, Problems, Pitfalls and Prospects, Wiesbaden 2007. 
56 Wherever this is not the case, we are dealing with failing or al-
ready failed states. Cf. Thomas Risse, Governance in Räumen 
begrenzter Staatlichkeit. ‘Failed states’ werden zum zentralen Prob-
lem der Weltpolitik, in: Internationale Politik 60: 9. 2005, 6-12. 
57 This category includes all cases, in which the state directly 
contracts private service providers. Also ranging in this group are 
situations where the state demands certain standards, but leaves 
their implementation to private organizations. An example of the 
latter is passenger screening at Frankfurt Airport, which is legally 
required, while the responsibility for its implementation is placed 
on the airport operator. (This, to name just one remarkable 
outcome of such a public-private-partnership (PPP), can lead – as 
for instance at Frankfurt/Main Airport – to preferential treatment 
of selected passengers in the fast lane, taking place in the context 
of legally required security controls, but based on customer loyal-
ty and discount programs offered by private airlines.) 
58 This can be observed in the fields of private object security or 
petty crime. As pointed out by Philippe Robert, Bürger, Kriminal-
ität und Staat. With a foreword by Fritz Sack, Wiesbaden 2005, 
176, 239, these issues have almost completely drifted out of the 
focus of security policy of many Western states. As a result, de-
fense and investigation for petty crime in shops, malls, and com-
plete shopping areas in cities, as well as object security is largely 
left up to private security providers, who are largely commis-
sioned by shopkeepers and business owners. 
The state thus privatizes sovereign functions and 
areas of responsibility, without, however, completely 
relinquishing them, i.e. these function areas are only 
partially privatized. In this way the state becomes 
capable of taking an ambiguous, public-private hy-
brid position. The state itself undergoes privatiza-
tion, becoming capable of performing – according to 
political convenience and expediency – as private 
actor represented by private security subcontrac-
tors at one time, and as public, governmental actor 
at another time.59 In the involvement of private 
service providers in sovereign function areas we 
can thus discern beside the first, apparent level of 
privatization (public functions becoming private 
ones) a second level of privatization referring to the 
very actor quality of the state. The privatization of 
the state’s actor quality takes place as an act of 
boundary setting between the public and the private 
sphere (as two areas of political and epistemic validi-
ty), with demarcation lines that now have become 
flexible and volatile. 
We can conclude that the boundary between the 
public and the private sphere is in flux in a twofold 
sense. Not only are we dealing with a changing 
boundary line, which would imply to merely recate-
gorize certain issues or subject areas as public or as 
private affairs.60 The crux of the matter consists in 
the governmental actor’s self-privatization, thus in 
the political and epistemic constitution of a public-
private hybrid. This second dimension of privatiza-
tion qualitatively goes beyond a co-operation in 
terms of a public-private partnership (PPP)61 because 
the boundary line between the public and the private 
emerges and appears in the public sphere itself and 
establishes a privatized public actor. It is again in a 
twofold sense that this process is accompanied by an 
increased volatility of the boundary between the 
public and the private realm. On the one hand, we 
can identify volatility in a quantitative sense, com-
prising the possibility to situational and spontaneous 
                                                 
59 The employment of both state and private security agents (from 
Blackwater) in New Orleans after hurricane Katrina may serve as 
an example. Cf. Jeremy Scahill, Blackwater Down, in: The Nation, 
October 20, 2005. 
60 For instance, the introduction of public health insurance in the 
USA represents a re-categorization of health care no longer only 
as a private but also as a public affair. 
61 On PPP see Detlef Sack, Governance und Politics. Die Instituti-
onalisierung öffentlich-privater Partnerschaften in Deutschland, 
Baden-Baden 2009. 
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changes of private-public boundary lines. On the 
other hand, and in a qualitative sense, the volatility 
of the private-public boundary affects the state’s 
actor status itself by enabling the state to shift be-
tween a private and a public actor status. 
 
3.2 Public privacy and the volatility of the boundary 
The volatility of the boundary between the private 
and the public sphere is, however, also significant 
beyond the particular phenomenon of the govern-
mental actor’s self-privatization. Already the mere 
volatility of the boundary in itself is capable of coun-
teracting its essential function. This, again, is most 
clearly evident in the subject area of security policy, 
especially when it comes to cross-border security. 
In the OECD world,62 security authorities have 
been expanding their competences and powers for 
several years now, and they have justified this with 
the defense against cross-border risks (usually ter-
rorism, organized crime in the broadest sense, illegal 
migration, and pandemics).63 In systematic terms, 
such expansions can be understood as the state en-
tering into spheres that were formerly private and 
largely free from state interference. This is therefore, 
firstly, a change of the boundary line between the 
public and the private sphere. The boundary’s exist-
ence and its constitutive and functional logic are 
however not per se called into question: Laws and 
regulations as, to give some recent examples from 
Germany, those for data retention, the eavesdrop-
ping operation also called ‘Lauschangriff’, online 
computer surveillance, retrospective preventive 
detention, or the control of “‘suspect’ products as 
                                                 
62 As this article does not aim at an empirical overview my exam-
ples are mainly from Germany. The expansion of state compe-
tences in the field of security policy, however, represents an 
international trend. See for instance David Garland, The Culture 
of Control. Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society, 
Oxford 2002; Buzan/Wæver/de Wilde, Boulder–London (see note 
47); Didier Bigo/Anastassia Tsoukala (eds.), Terror, Insecurity 
and Liberty, Abingdon 2008; Andreas Vasilache, Human Securiti-
zation. State Theory, Governmentality, and the Ambivalence of 
Security in Europe, in: Christoph Schuck (ed.), Security in a 
Changing Global Environment. Challenging the Human Security 
Approach, Baden-Baden 2011, 123-152. 
63 Suffice it to say in this context that the discursive constitutional-
ization and representation of international, exterritorial spaces as 
areas of threat, danger, and insecurity still works surprisingly well, 
even in the light of substantially increased cross-border mobility 
and information. On a discursive level, it seems that the state of 
nature still lurks beyond the national border. 
alcohol or tobacco”,64 reset and redefine the bounda-
ry line between the public and the private and there-
by constitute formerly private issues and areas as 
problems that are now under public care. Secondly, 
such regulations – because of the frequency, the 
permanence, and the continuity of shifting the 
boundary between the public and the private sphere 
to the disadvantage of the latter – at the same time 
undermine this very boundary’s reliable clarity, 
which is one of its essential functions. There is a risk 
that the fluctuating volatility and the fleetingness of 
the demarcation between the public and the private 
will eventually undermine exactly that degree of 
certainty and reliability, which is essential for the 
existence of the private sphere and without which it 
would ultimately lose its protective function in the 
sense of the citizens’ negative freedom. 
All the regulations mentioned here have been re-
jected, most of them by the German Federal Consti-
tutional Court, some by European courts, as being 
unconstitutional and/or incompatible with human 
and/or civil rights. From a technical point of view, 
this indeed could be referred to as failed politics, as 
poor, unprofessional governance. To leave it at that, 
however, would mean to underestimate both the 
systematic and normative consequences of the vola-
tility of the private-public-boundary for its main 
function and its raison d’être. In the last years, the 
respective governments and policy-makers seem to 
react to the perpetual juridical rejection of such laws 
and regulations either by passing yet more rigorous 
regulations (this happened for instance in the con-
text of the eavesdropping operation ‘Lauschangriff’ 
in Germany or in the EU with regard to the manda-
tory car-positioning system ‘eCall’, which at the 
moment is pushed forward although the directive on 
the generalized retention of data has recently been 
overruled by the European Court of Justice (ECJ)), 
or by seeking ever-new possibilities for state inter-
ference and intervention – even if they are aware of 
the fact that the regulations in question will not 
endure, but be overruled by constitutional courts.65 
This whole procedure and circle of intrusive rule-
making, abrogation, and re-establishing of intrusive 
                                                 
64 Castel, London (see note 37), 289. 
65 This was apparently what happened in the case of the German 
Retention of Data Bill, which the Federal Constitutional Court 
rejected in the beginning of 2010. The Federal Government didn't 
even make a serious effort to defend the bill in the hearing. 
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regulations, substantially contributes to keeping the 
boundary between the public and the private sphere 
pending, as a moving, flexible, and volatile bounda-
ry. The German Federal Constitutional Court re-
cently stated that the perpetual attempts at state 
interference with the private sphere are not only 
problematic on a case-by-case basis. Above all, creat-
ing a situation of virulent insecurity and uncertainty 
about the state’s possibilities for intervening could 
result in an atmosphere of state omnipresence and 
develop “lasting intimidating effects on the exercise 
of liberty [Freiheitswahrnehmung]”.66 According to 
the court, such a situation is suited to “cause a 
diffusely threatening feeling of being under observa-
tion that can diminish the unreserved and non-
intimidated exercise of one’s basic rights in many 
areas”.67 The ECJ argued in a similar way when it 
finally rejected the European directive on the reten-
tion of data on April 08, 2014. The court argued that 
the directive not only “entails an interference with 
the fundamental rights of practically the entire Eu-
ropean population”,68 but that it “is likely to generate 
in the minds of the persons concerned the feeling 
that their private lives are the subject of constant 
surveillance”.69 
Under such conditions, the boundary between 
the public and the private sphere lacks reliability and 
certainty. Accordingly, the private sphere is merely 
constituted until recall, as a situational and only 
partially private sphere – the privacy of which is 
fleeting and altogether indecisive. As a final conse-
quence, this may result in the boundary to lose its 
factual function and significance – while, inciden-
                                                 
66 BVerfG, 1 BvR 256/08 from March 02, 2010, paragraph no. 233, 
http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rs20100302_1bvr025608.ht
ml, accessed March 25, 2014. 
67 BVerfG, 1 BvR 256/08 from March 02, 2010, paragraph no. 212, 
http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rs20100302_1bvr025608.ht
ml, accessed March 25, 2014. 
68 European Court of Justice, Judgment of the Court (Grand 
Chamber) from April 08, 2014 in joined cases C-293/12 and 
C-594/12, paragraph no. 56, 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?doclang=EN
&text=&pageIndex=3&part=1&mode=req&docid=150642&occ=f
irst&dir=&cid=587846, accessed April 10, 2014. 
69 European Court of Justice, Judgment of the Court (Grand 
Chamber) from April 08, 2014 in joined cases C-293/12 and 
C-594/12, paragraph no. 37, 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?doclang=EN
&text=&pageIndex=3&part=1&mode=req&docid=150642&occ=f
irst&dir=&cid=587846, accessed April 10, 2014. 
tally, in its microstructure the boundary may persist 
completely unchanged as a strict and dichotomous, 
political and epistemic demarcation line separating 
the public from the private sphere, even if the latter 
in its substance and purpose might finally continue 
to exist only as a simulacrum. 
 
4. Concluding remarks: The boundaries of the state 
The presented heuristic considerations indicate that 
traditional boundary structures originating in the 
systemic logics of the modern state may well contin-
ue to exist under conditions of political internation-
alization. These boundaries, which in fact seem par-
ticularly prone to become precarious in times of 
globalization, even in the process of adjustment and 
change turn out to be persistent with regard to their 
basic logics and rationalities. And even in the just 
outlined case of the private-public boundary becom-
ing unreliable, this loss of significance is based on 
the continual discursive and legal enforcement of the 
political and epistemic strictness and rigour of this 
boundary as such. 
Nonetheless, the provided systematic and micro-
scopic reflections on boundaries are not intended to 
suggest that the political and epistemic demarcations 
of the state may in no case become blurred, permea-
ble, modified or even disappear. Of course, in the 
context of political internationalization and globali-
zation, boundaries like those between public and 
private responsibilities, state powers,70 between re-
gional, national and supranational competences, and 
also between religious, ethnic, etc. affiliations of the 
citizens are renegotiated and sometimes fundamen-
tally called into question. 
However, from a systematic perspective on 
boundaries it should be emphasized that beside and 
within tendencies toward the emancipation of poli-
tics from the boundaries of the historical model of 
the sovereign territorial state,71 there is also an obvi-
ous persistence of systematic delimitations and 
                                                 
70 The emerging international jurisdiction could be an example for 
this. Cf. Christian Joerges/Inger-Johanne Sand/Gunther Teubner 
(eds.), Transnational Governance and Constitutionalism, Oxford 
2004; Michael Zürn/Bernhard Zangl (eds.), Verrechtlichung – 
Baustein für Gobal Governance?, Bonn 2004; Michael 
Zürn/Christian Joerges (eds.), Law and Governance in Postnational 
Europe. Compliance Beyond the Nation-State, Cambridge 2005. 
71 Cf. Mathias Albert/Willibald Steinmetz, Be- und Entgrenzun-
gen von Staatlichkeit im politischen Kommunikationsraum, in: 
Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 20-21. 2007, 17-23. 
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boundaries that are constitutive in terms of state 
theory. This persistence particularly refers to the 
(micro-) logics of these boundaries. Although in the 
context of political internationalization boundaries 
may become volatile, unsteady, and erratic, they 
however do not necessarily lose their strict political 
and epistemic distinguishing function. This is obvi-
ous in the expansion of foreign policy and its execu-
tive inclination, which not only does not conflict 
with the traditional demarcation logics between 
domestic and foreign affairs, but is in fact based on 
it. In the course of and beside deboundarizations, 
reboundarizations, and the blurring or removal of 
boundaries caused by the increase and intensifica-
tion of international relations, the systematic bound-
aries of the modern state may in fact remain stable, 
intensify, and/or undergo adaptation and reconsoli-
dation by change of position and location, thus by 
shifting and redrawing the course of the boundary. 
Thus, in processes and structures of political inter-
nationalization traditional boundaries do not neces-
sarily dissolve or disappear, but we are rather dealing 
with their volatility, i.e. a flexibility of boundary 
lines, which does not modify or weaken the bounda-
ry’s epistemic and political quality or relevance. 
Because of their systematic relevance and even 
constitutive function for the modern state, the 
boundaries and their realization modes discussed 
here seem suited to indicate the persistence and 
adaptation of the boundaries of stateness in the pro-
cess of change. Indeed, this paper is focused on very 
significant boundaries in terms of state theory: the 
political and epistemic distinction between domestic 
and foreign policy is a core aspect of the “Domestic-
Foreign Frontier”72 and is closely related to the 
boundary between executive and legislative authori-
ty, while the boundary between the private and the 
public sphere is essential for the idea of law. It can be 
assumed that similar indications and results would 
also yield from examining other boundaries not 
discussed in the present paper. An examination of, 
for instance, the shifting of the protection of national 
territorial borders far beyond the actual, physical 
borderline73 as well as the intensification of border 
                                                 
72 James N. Rosenau, Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier. 
Exploring Governance in a Turbulent World, Cambridge 1997. 
73 For examples see Mau, 2010 (see note 11), 62. 
control and surveillance within the state territory,74 
may demonstrate the external territorial border’s 
virtual geographical variability and volatility. At the 
same time, even such a change in border security and 
of the virtual location of the boundary itself could 
turn out to still being based on the traditional logics 
of political and epistemic boundary setting by the 
state. It would be worthwhile to thoroughly consider 
how such dynamics take place and which theoretical, 
empirical, and normative consequences result from 
these processes. A systematic focus on boundaries 
that are constitutive for modern stateness seems 
altogether suited to contribute to a more differenti-
ated assessment of the hypothesis on the debounda-




                                                 
74 This trend can be observed not only in the EU, but also with 
regard to the USA. 
